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A. The Relevance of Background Principles.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that limitations 
inherent in the title to land may play a role in the extent to 
which that land may be validly regulated. Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). It said that 
"regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of 
land... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the 
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of 
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership." (p.
2900).
A very recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court illustrates the difficulty of applying the Lucas holding to 
wetlands. In Lopes v. City of Peabody, 417 Mass. 299, 629 NE2d 
1312 (1994) the court addressed the question of whether the City 
of Peabody's "wetlands conservancy zoning district" could validly 
prohibit the filling of Mr. Lopes' quarter-acre lot adjoining 
Devil's Dishfull Pond. The state supreme court remanded the case 
back to the trial court with instructions, including the following
If the judge concludes that the zoning regulation 
deprives the parcel of ail economically beneficial use, the
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Lucas opinion advises us that there is a categorical 
regulatory taking, unless under the land use law of the 
Commonwealth [of Massachusetts] the proposed use would be a 
nuisance or otherwise impermissible. Lucas, supra at 2900. 
In that instance, a zoning regulation could validly prohibit 
in advance any use of the land that State law would bar in 
any event. Id. It is not for us now to be specific on the 
subject of restrictions that, for example, the law of 
nuisance and the law of riparian rights impose on the use of 
land subject to periodic flooding. See von Henneberg v. 
Generazio, 403 Mass. 519... [and five other earlier 
Massachusetts cases]
Although the court leaves it up to the trial court to make 
an initial interpretation of the earlier Massachusetts cases on 
Mr. Lopes land, the court's opinion certainly illustrates that an 
understanding of the state common law relating to the permissible 
use of wetlands will be a crucial issue in determining the 
permissible extent of wetland regulation in many cases. And the 
state common law has developed out of the common law of England.
B. Wetlands under English Common Law.
In prehistoric times, the evidence indicates that 
substantial tracts of England were subject to periodic flooding 
and were covered with marshland vegetation. From early 
historical times these areas were known by a host of different 
names, most commonly fen, bog, marsh, or moor.
1. The Fen People.
An appreciation of wetlands as having natural beauty or 
ecological significance is primarily a twentieth century 
phenomenon. Vast fen and marsh areas were ugly in the minds of
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medieval and middle ages people; it was only the fen people, for 
whom the wetlands provided a living, that seem to have found any 
beauty or value in large tracts of wetland. For the fen people, 
the wetlands provided grazing, fishing, fowling, gathering, and 
the cultivation of certain characteristic crops. For their 
peculiar lifestyle and attitude the upland majority viewed these 
people with hardly less disdain than their watery environment 
itself.
For quite obvious reasons, it was also these same fen people 
who from the earliest times developed and applied extensive 
regulations for the use and protection of the fens and marshes. 
The economic activity of wetland communities set them apart from 
the lifestyle of the upland majority, and often dictated a 
different pattern of land use. Villages typically occupied the 
high ground surrounding a wetland, and within the wetland the 
villages shared commons of pasture, fishing, and other economic 
activity.
Eventually these villages divided up the common fen they had 
shared into parishes, consisting frequently of a long and narrow 
strip of land with one end at the sea, then extending across the 
higher siltland and well inland into the peat marsh. Each 
village usually had reclaimed some land on which crops were 
planted, and sometimes salt was evaporated from sea water. Each 
also enjoyed a much larger tract of property extending into the 
peatland, which was used for pasture and other wetland
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From the earliest times, those who settled the wetlands 
built and maintained banks and drains to protect the land from 
the floods of both the sea and upland rivers. Archaeologists and 
historians have found evidence that the Romans settled many 
wetland areas of England and some of the banks that the held the 
tides from seaside marshes were traditionally thought of as Roman 
in origin. For practical purposes, however, the legal history of 
wetlands begins with the arrival of the Anglo-Saxons in about the 
fifth century.
The Anglo-Saxon "mark" (the precursor of the feudal manor) 
consisted of four main categories of land: village, arable
fields, meadowland and waste land. Wetlands were particularly 
noted for their bountiful supply of winter hay, a commodity often 
scarce in the upland. In addition, upland pasture tended to 
become overgrazed in the summer. This made wetland pasture 
valuable in summer. It was apparently a common practice to drive 
livestock to the wetlands for the summer.
The seclusion of wetland areas particularly suited the needs 
of monasteries. Ecclesiastical bodies became major landowners in 
wetland areas: the Lord of the Manor was frequently Bishop or 
Abbot. Whether the owner of the land was secular or religious, 
however, the actual work on the land was the job of the tenants
activities.
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or villeins. The tenants and villeins of. the mark (and later of 
the Norman manor), who lived and tilled their individual plots on 
the upland or on islands, normally shared rights of common in the 
fen or marsh for as much pasture, turf cutting, etc. as they 
required to meet the needs of themselves and their livestock.
This mechanism allowed use of the wetland for its characteristic 
economic activities.
To use and protect their commons, the fen people developed 
complex systems of rules that governed the economic activities of 
the middle-ages fenland and stipulated by whom, when, and how 
much the fens could be exploited. For example, before being set 
out onto the commons, livestock had to be branded. Violators 
were often punished for allowing cattle belonging to persons 
outside the local villages to pasture on the wetland commons. 
Another function of the fen codes was to define and settle 
disputes over rights of fishing, which various fen people held in 
intricate patterns both exclusively and in common. The codes 
tried to protect the commons from overuse by limiting, for 
example, the amount of certain resources that individuals could 
remove, or the number of animals that could be grazed.
The legal validity of these wetland codes under the common 
law derived from custom exercised "from time immemorial." Such 
rules were valid among the tenants and villeins of a manor, and 
between them and their lord; the customary court of the manor
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enforced such regulations. Digby noted as late as the nineteenth 
century that the governing body of some upland parishes still 
informally exercised regulation over commons in the waste of the 
parish. As a general rule longstanding local custom could have 
the effect of law. Proponents of the custom had the burden of 
showing the custom was exercised continuously without challenge 
since before 1189, and was sufficiently certain, compulsory, and 
consistent with other customs to permit enforcement. Fen codes 
originating in later times had more formal legislative sanction; 
a code of fen laws was officially enacted for the fens of 
Lincolnshire in 1573, and remained in force into the 19th 
century.
Rules for maintaining and repairing the embankments, drains, 
and channels that controlled the flow of water through the fens 
made it the duty of every landholder whose land was thus 
protected to maintain certain portions of the banks and drains. 
Disputes arose when one landholder neglected this duty, because 
one landholder’s failure to meet his obligation imperiled the 
livelihood of many others. When an unusual event such as a storm 
caused major damage, all the benefiting landholders were 
obligated to share in the cost of repair.
Local authorities originally enforced the duty to repair 
banks and drains. The Crown, however, was sufficiently 
interested in protecting the wetland economy, and local control
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was sufficiently unsatisfactory for major problems, that in the 
mid 1200s Henry III began to appoint his own commissioners to see 
that the wetlands were protected from flood. These Commissioners 
of Sewers were authorized by statute in 1531, and exercised 
considerable authority over the structures that protected the 
wetlands. (It should be noted that "sewer" referred to any body 
of flowing water.) Commissioners sat as judges of Courts of 
Sewers who had the power to adjudicate disputes over repair and 
maintenance costs, to seize the property of landholders who 
refused to pay, to authorize work on drainage facilities, and to 
enact ordinances for local regulation. The Commissions operated 
into the 20th century, when the drainage act of 1933 replaced 
them. Jaffe & Henderson noted that the Commissions of Sewers 
represent one of the earliest examples of a truly administrative 
body.
Wetland owners were also subject to limits on the embanking 
of wetlands in order to avoid injury to other landowners. In 
addition to overseeing repair and maintenance of banks and 
drains, the Commissions of Sewers and the common law courts heard 
disputes over changes in property use that affected other 
property owners. Landholders were in at least some cases obliged 
to ask the Crown for a writ of ad quod damnum before making
significant changes in the wetland landscape. Writing in the 
seventeenth century, Dugdale records that in 1578 the Prior of 
Billygntone applied to the King for this writ to drain a marsh of
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60 acres belonging to the Prior’s Manor. The King’s tribunal for 
the county inquired into “whether the same might be effected 
without prejudice to [the King] or others”. The jury found no 
prejudice to others in the project, and found that the land so 
reclaimed would increase noticeably in value. In another case, 
however, a jury found in 1664 that the Prior of Christ Church in 
Canterbury had built a gutter on a wetland manor that was “so 
raised [that] the water, so descending from the upper parts . . .
could not passe through it, whereby . . . the said fishing became 
totally lost . . . “ and other traditional uses could not be made 
of the flowing water. The court required that the gutter be 
placed back in its original condition.
As noted earlier, extensive wetlands in common law England 
were often shared among villagers as commons. Such rights of 
common in the wetlands could be held as part of an estate in 
land. Free tenants could assert this right against the manorial 
lord, or any other person, in the King’s court. Villeins, whose 
later successors were copyholders, could assert similar rights 
against the lord in the customary court of the manor, but against 
others they had to assert the right in the name of the fee holder 
(i.e., the lord).
One way a tenant of a manor could show rights of common 
pasture was by demonstrating that he and his predecessors held a 
freehold estate originating by enfeoffment occurring before 1290
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(when the Statute Quia Emptores banned further subinfeudation) . 
These rights of “common appendant” in the lord’s waste attached 
by law to freehold tenements.
A second form of holding a right of common attached to an 
estate in land was "common appurtenant." This form of commons 
was available to non-tenants of a manor, and had to be asserted 
by anyone claiming a profit, or the right to take some resource 
from the land of another. Common appurtenant could originate by 
grant, but most often was asserted by prescription: the commoner 
asserted he and his predecessors had used his commons for a 
period of time such that “the memory of man runneth not to the 
contrary.” Interpretation and statute later defined more 
precisely what period time supported a prescriptive right in 
property. Early interpretation established that the time to 
which the memory man runneth was 1189; prescription had to show 
use of the right uninterrupted from then. The Prescription Act of 
1833 established fixed periods of years for prescription.
Asserting rights of common, however, held potential pitfalls 
for the wetlands people. Many important wetlands rights were 
profits (e.g., fishing, peat cutting, fowling, and reed 
gathering) that the commoner had to assert as common appurtenant 
whether or not he asserted against his own lord. Prescription 
was the most usual way to acquire a right of common appurtenant. 
Under a peculiarity of the common law, Prescription under the
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common law was based on the theory that long use of a right or 
property was evidence of a grant from the feeholder that was lost 
in antiquity. This was fiction; historians agree that most 
prescriptive rights never actually involved a grant, but rather 
truly represented longstanding uses, often predating the feudal 
legal system. Nevertheless, the result was that persons who 
could not have received a grant of the right in question could 
not acquire it by prescription, and since grants could be made to 
individuals or corporate bodies, but not to indefinite groups 
such as the inhabitants of a village, unless a village was 
incorporated, the commoners dwelling therein as a group could not 
assert a prescriptive right to the profits of the wetland, no 
matter how long they had enjoyed them.
Wetland rights of common no doubt endured as long-standing 
local custom partly because that argument alone had force of law 
between the lord of a manor and his tenants. Additionally, 
because the wetlands had little other economic use until they 
were drained, local customs may not have been frequently 
challenged.
Another possible difficulty for wetland commoners was the 
right of the lord of a manor, under the Statutes of Merton in 
1236 and Westminster II in 1285, to approve, or grant areas of 
waste land to individuals to hold privately. However, the 
statutes required that enough commons remain to accommodate the
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needs of the commoners. The overall impact of "approvement" in 
wetlands is not known, but it is known that some piecemeal 
reclamation and enclosure of wetlands took place throughout the 
middle ages.
In spite of potential obstacles, the lifestyle of the 
wetlands people survived relatively unimpeded into the 
seventeenth century, when new technology began to make it 
possible to increase wetland drainage dramatically. The 
Parliament passed one of the first statutes to encourage private 
undertakers to finance drainage efforts in the year 1600. The 
acts awarded a share of lands recovered to private undertakers 
who successfully reclaimed fenland. Drainage involved more than 
the banking out of the tidal and freshwater floods that had been 
done for centuries; it meant sufficient drainage of large tracts 
of land so as to change the character of the land. Drainage 
allowed previously waterlogged pasture land to produce crops, and 
previously inundated land to be used for pasture, on a scale 
never before realized.
The statutes that authorized drainage purported to protect 
the interests of the commoners on the fen, but the violent 
resistance that wetland commoners raised against drainage 
suggests that they found this protection inadequate. What one 
historian called the Battle for the Fens rose to the intensity of 
vandalism, mob action, and even murder. Drainage was never
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successful in drying out all the marshes and fens, but its 
massive success shows that the fen people did not win the battle. 
After numerous false starts and a hiatus for civil war, the.. 
drainage effort in the Fens expanded gradually. Vast areas of 
the Fens were drained, and the effort at first appeared wildly 
successful. Nature, however, had surprises in store. Shrinkage 
of the dried peat often lowered the level of the peatland to sea 
level or below, causing the loss of the fenland back to the 
floods. The development of the steam engine finally provided the 
reliable energy needed to keep the peatlands consistently dry. 
Today, some of the former wetlands is regarded very productive 
agricultural land, but in other places the shrinkage of the peat 
has exposed the infertile clay beneath.
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